Messerschmitt Bf-110C-4/B Zerstorer

From The Air Combat Wiki

Contents 1 Fighter Ace Screenshots 2 Fighter Ace Ratings 3 Fighter Ace Performance 4 Historical Statistics 5 Strengths 6 Weaknesses 7 History 8 Sources 9 See Also

Fighter Ace Screenshots

Fighter Ace museum screenshot by Doug@HQ	Fighter Ace museum screenshot by Doug@HQ	Fighter Ace museum screenshot by Doug@HQ	Fighter Ace museum screenshot by Doug@HQ
Fighter Ace museum screenshot by Doug@HQ	Fighter Ace museum screenshot by Doug@HQ	Fighter Ace museum screenshot by Doug@HQ

Fighter Ace Ratings

Durability: 5

Speed: 6

Maneuverability: 5

Firepower: 4

Climb Rate: 4

Ground Attack: 4

Fighter Ace Performance

Top Speeds						Climb Rates
	Sea Level	4921' 1500m	9843' 3000m	19685' 6000m	Best Speed	Best IAS	to 1000m	to 3000m	to 6000m
mph	284	305	322	336	342@ 22966'	165 mph	1:39	4:27	9:45
mph WEP	294	314	323	345	349@ 22638'
kph	457	490	518	541	550@ 7000m	265 kph
kph WEP	473	506	520	555	562@ 6900m

Historical Statistics

Service Date: June 1940

Primary Guns: 4x MG17 7.92mm machine guns with 1000 rpg in nose

Secondary Guns: 2x MG-FF 20mm cannon with 180 rpg in nose

Defensive Guns: 1x MG15 7.92mm flex machine gun with 750 rpg in dorsal position

Ordnance: 2x 551 lb (250 kg) bombs

Engine(s): 2x Daimler-Benz DB-601N in-lines rated for 1,200 hp at sea level

Int Fuel Capacity: 2,016 lbs (914 kg)

Ext Fuel Capacity: none

Maximum Speeds: 293 mph (472 kph) at sea level, 349 mph (560 kph) at 22,965 ft (7,000 m)

Ceiling: 32,810 ft (10,000 m)

Loaded Weight: 14,881 lbs (6,750 kg)

Wing Area: 413.3 sq ft (38.4 sq m)

Wing Loading: 36.0 lbs/sq ft (175.8 kg/sq m)

Strengths

Durability: The larger heavy fighter can take more damage than smaller, single-engine planes.

Ammo Load: With twice the ammo load of the Bf-109E-4, the Zerstörer can bring down early war bombers with ease.

Weaknesses

Maneuverability: The slow roll rate makes dogfighting in the Zerstörer a losing proposition.

History

Driven by the need for a dual role, long-range escort and ground-attack fighter (a 'Zerstörer', destroyer), the RLM initiated a design competition between the various German aircraft manufacturers. While other manufacturers submitted designs that were more light-bomber than fighter, BF (Bayerische Flugzeugwerke) chief designer Willy Messerschmitt designed a sleek, streamlined plane that earned the contract.

Unfortunately, the Daimler-Benz 600A series engines on which the design was based, were unsuitable for fighter use and the first prototypes had to use the much less powerful Junkers Jumo 210C engine. However, using the lower powered engines gave the design team a chance to test the airframe and make changes that would result in better streamlining and reduced drag.

With the imminent release of the more powerful DB-601A on the horizon, the assembly line and production machines were set up in the early spring of 1938. However, as with the DB-600, the new powerplant proved problematic and the Jumo 210Ga was substituted for B series production, of which about 45 planes were built for training purposes.

Finally in late 1938 the DB-601A-1 engine was certified for fighter use and the first Bf-110C-1s rolled off the production line by the end of January 1939. The changes in the C series were minor. The C-2 introduced a new radio, the C-3 had improved MG-FF cannon, and the C-4 added about 500 lbs. of crew armor. The C-4/B model was fitted with an ETC-250 bomb rack under the fuselage, which allowed the carriage of two 250 kg. bombs. To offset the additional drag, the more powerful DB-601N engine was used in place of the DB-601A.

By mid-summer 39, front-line units began receiving their C-1s, just in time for the invasion of Poland. Despite misgivings about the plane's maneuverability, the plane performed well against the slower and more maneuverable Polish fighters. When Polish fighter opposition declined, the Zerstörergruppen were largely switched from escort to ground strafing tasks, their total losses for the period 1 - 28 Sept amounted to only 12 aircraft.

The Luftwaffenführungsstab considered that the Zerstörer had gained its spurs during the Polish campaign. Its shortcomings in fighter-versus-fighter combat, which, to some extent, had been foreseen, had not proved overly serious, although it was appreciated that the principal opponent had been of obsolete type.

More sucesses were to follow. On 17 Dec 39 I/ZG 76 had transferred to Jever and when Wellingtons the next day flew armed reconnaissance over the Schilling Roads, the Jade Estuary and Wilhelmshaven, they encountered the Bf 110 for the first time. The outcome was disastrous for the RAF, of 24 Wellingtons, 12 were lost, nine of these falling victim to the Bf 110 C-1s. Otherwise the Bf 110s saw only limited use over the Western Front during the so-called Phoney War, but two Zerstörergruppen were included in the Order of Battle for Operation Weserübung. Although they encountered little fighter opposition, attrition rose sharply, and most of the 25 Bf 110 C-1s lost on operations during April were casualties of the Norwegian campaign.

For the West Offensive, 248 Bf 110 Cs were attached to Luftflotten 2 and 3. Despite air superiority and, at times, complete supremacy enjoyed by the Luftwaffe, some 57 Bf 110s had been lost by the end of May. The fighting in French skies in which the Zerstörergruppen encountered relatively modern single-seat interceptors for the first time produced tacit admission that the Bf 110 could not effectively combat such warplanes on their own terms, and new tactics were formulated for use when they encountered enemy single-seaters in strength. On such occasions, the Bf 110s formed a defensive circle, protecting each other’s tail, and enabling several guns to be brought to bear simultaneously against fighters attacking the periphery.

On 20 July 1940, a total of 278 Bf 110s was available for the Battle of Britain. Of these, 200 were serviceable. The Bf 110 C-4/B was delivered to Erprobungsstelle 210 (an experimental unit assigned the task of evolving the most effective fighter-bomber Jabo tactics) the same month. They initiated operations against British shipping in the Channel, and enjoyed immediate success. The E.Gr.210 was to operate throughout the ‘Battle of Britain’, using its aircraft singly and in small groups, and making maximum use of the element of surprise by use of terrain-following tactics.

Overall strength of the Zerstörergruppen was virtually unchanged on operation Adlerangriff on 10 Aug, when 289 Bf 110 fighters and fighter-bombers were available, of which 224 were serviceable. In theory the Bf 110s, with their superior endurance, were to entice the British fighter squadrons into combat. The bomber squadrons would then follow at a suitable distance, arriving when the defending fighters had exhausted their fuel and were thus powerless to intervene. Furthermore, the fighters sitting on their bases re-arming and re-fueling would be extremely vulnerable, and would afford excellent targets for the bombers and the additional Bf 110s escorting them.

From the outset this theory proved totally fallacious. To the chagrin of the Zerstörergruppen, the capabilities of their Bf 110s fell far short of expectations. While the forward-firing armament of the twin-engined Messerschmitt was undeniably lethal, the maneuverability was sluggish by comparision with the Hurricanes and Spitfires, and the single MG 15 in the rear cockpit afforded little protection against attack from astern. Its acceleration and speed were insufficient to enable it to avoid combat when opposed by superior numbers of interceptors, and as soon as RAF Fighter Command had taken the measure of the Bf 110, the Zerstörergruppen suffered appalling operational attrition, and rather than serve in the escort role as foreseen, the farcical situation was to arise in which the escort fighters had themselves to be escorted by Bf 109s. During August alone 120 Bf 110s were lost, the majority of them after Adlertag, and thus within less than 3 weeks the Zerstörergruppen had lost some 40% of the aircraft. Despite a substantial reduction in sorties and changes in tactics, the Zerstörergruppen losses rose to 203 Bf 110s by the end of the Battle of Britain. Several Gruppen had been disbanded owing to the catastrophic losses.

Meanwhile the Bf 110 had already tined upon a new career as a night fighter. On the night of 15/16 May 40, a force of 99 Hampdens, Wellingtons and Whitleys had inaugurated Bomber Command’s strategic offensive with an attack on industrial and railway targets in the Ruhr. A few days after the termination of the campaign in the West the Bf 110 Cs of two Staffeln were transferred to Düsseldorf for instruction in night fighting tactics. Together with another Staffel, which converted from the Bf 109 D to the Bf 110 C, they became the nucleus of the Nachtjagddivision being created by colonel Josef Kammhuber, being deployed at Venlo in the Netherlands.

Sources

Campbell, Jerry L.; Messerschmitt Bf-110 Zerstörer In Action; Squadron/Signal Publications, Carrollton, TX; 1977.

Donald, David; Warplanes Of The Luftwaffe; Aerospace Publishing, London; 1994.

Chant, Chris; German Warplanes Of World War II; Amber Books, Ltd., London; 1999.

Green, William; Warplanes of the Third Reich; Doubleday and Company, Garden City, NY; 1970.

See Also

Fighter Ace Planes Inventory

Messerschmitt A.G.

Aircraft Manufacturers During World War II